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Stanley Cavell is one of very few philosophers who systematically reflect on the 
impact and influence of autobiographical detail, experience, and preferences on 
their philosophical work. The aim of this essay is to show how Cavell’s use of 
autobiographical exploration is rooted in his early aesthetic theory, in particular 
his view of the similarities between philosophy and aesthetic criticism. Cavell 
argues that criticism starts by exploiting and incorporating a subjective vantage 
point, eventually bringing the reader to test the significance of a work on herself. 
In his ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy’, Cavell states exactly this form 
of appeal to the ‘We’ of author and reader as the basic move of his own version 
of ‘ordinary language philosophy’. It is because of the connections Cavell sees 
between criticism and philosophy that his aesthetic diagnosis harks back on his 
overall critical style of thinking.
Keywords: Stanley Cavell; autobiography; art criticism; ordinary language; 
aesthetic reasons; philosophical style
It is common prejudice that philosophical reflection involves strict abstraction from the 
person of the writer putting it in words and on paper. Philosophy, so it seems, is a mat-
ter of interpersonally acceptable intuitions, arguments, and insights; as such it is virtually 
independent of its actual manner of expression. Autobiographies and memoirs, on the other 
hand, provide the interested public with supplementary tales to reconcile the man (most 
of the time) and his thought, a life and its achievement, usually from the vantage point of 
advanced age. In this picture, there is a neat division between theory and personality, both are 
to be dealt with in different accounts. Stanley Cavell is one of but a few philosophers who not 
only make use of, but also systematically reflect on, autobiographical writing not just as a way 
of making themselves known, but as a way of doing philosophy. Although this is clearly most 
visible in his 2010 memoir Little Did I Know, and most explicitly theoretically spelled out 
around a decade before in A Pitch of Philosophy, it is a thread running through the corpus of 
Cavell’s work. Concerning this systematic application of autobiography to philosophy, he is of 
course conscious of his precedents, not only in that he explicitly acknowledges their impact, 
but in that his writing incorporates several forms of autobiographical voices: Sometimes it is 
confessional in a way Saint Augustine’s and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s seminal philosophical 
autobiographies are. Sometimes it is boastful and self-centered, thus in line with Friedrich 
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Nietzsche’s hyperbolical Ecce Homo. In its best moments, though, it is perhaps closest to 
the way Walter Benjamin blends philosophical reflection and autobiographical narration, in 
Berlin Childhood, One-Way Street, or in his unfinished Arcades Project. Just like Benjamin is 
interested in autobiographical writing not for its own sake, but as a means to obtain truths 
from the ephemerous and exemplary, from memory and its forms of focusing and neglect-
ing, Cavell’s interest, similarly, maintains a simultaneous focus on the style and method of 
philosophical reflection.
I will argue that Cavell’s use of autobiography is grounded in the aesthetic underpinnings 
of his very philosophical method. This will involve a discussion of the use of autobiographical 
methods in relation to aesthetics. In particular, I will reflect on the role of the autobiographi-
cal in theorizing art. In the course of these reflections, I will pay close attention to Cavell’s 
philosophy. Thus, I will first bring to mind the position and significance of autobiographical 
remarks or allusions in Cavell’s aesthetics. Second, I will briefly summarize Cavell’s ideas con-
cerning the overall connection between ordinary language, philosophy, and autobiography, 
and argue for how his defence of autobiographical methods in philosophy is shaped by his 
views about art and criticism as well as his emphasis on philosophical style, or voice. Third, I 
will broaden the scope and point to some consequences or reverberations of Cavell’s sugges-
tions for aesthetics – and philosophy – in general.
I
Cavell’s aesthetics, to begin with, is no unified and easily accessible piece of theory, but is 
to be retrieved from the bulk of his writings. As I have reconstructed elsewhere, the corner-
stone of his philosophy of art is laid in his early essays and books about theatre, cinema, and 
contemporary (modernist) art.1 Above all, these are his studies on contemporary music and 
criticism, ‘Music Discomposed’ and ‘A Matter of Meaning It’, as well as his essays on Samuel 
Beckett’s Endgame, ‘Ending the Waiting Game’, and on William Shakespeare’s King Lear, ‘The 
Avoidance of Love’, all of them included in his early collection of essays, Must We Mean What 
We Say?. It is safe to say that almost all of the lines of thought developed in these early texts 
meet in Cavell’s first book on film, The World Viewed, which forms the largest study he devoted 
exclusively to the theory of a single art form. The book is known as outstandingly complex 
and it knits together quite a bunch of subjects. Among them are not only the ontology of 
film the book promises in its subtitle, but also film’s relationship to photography, theatre, 
and painting (after André Bazin), its inheritance of the narrative conventions of the realist 
novel, a reading of Baudelaire as a proto-theorist of cinema, a sketch of a theory of artistic 
modernism, and modernist painting in particular (corresponding to that of Michael Fried), as 
well as a conception of film as emblem of and redemption from modern scepticism, the latter 
subject reverberating Cavell’s general preoccupations (with modernism and scepticism)2 and 
giving them an aesthetic spin. But running through all these themes, and thus unifying them 
in an accentuated way, is the thread of autobiography I want to highlight here. Already in the 
preface of The World Viewed, Cavell invokes a strong connection between original experience, 
autobiographical record, and aesthetic exploration concerning his field of investigation. Here 
is what he states in the very opening paragraph:
 1 See Jochen Schuff, Ästhetisches Verstehen: Zugänge zur Kunst nach Wittgenstein und Cavell (Paderborn: Fink, 
2019), esp. Part II. See also Jay M. Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies: Late Modernism and the Meaning of 
Painting (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), chap. 3.
 2 See Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies, 81. 
Schuff: Aesthetics and Autobiography in Cavell152
Memories of movies are strand over strand with memories of my life. During the quar-
ter of a century (roughly from 1935 to 1960) in which going to the movies was a nor-
mal part of my week, it would no more have occurred to me to write a study of movies 
than to write my autobiography. Having completed the pages that follow, I feel that I 
have been composing a kind of metaphysical memoir – not the story of a period of my 
life but an account of the conditions it has satisfied.3
On the face of it, the passage serves to acknowledge the importance of movies in Cavell’s 
life and, consequently, in his memory. We are led to the impression that his memories of 
his own life and his memories of cinema blend together, and not only in the trivial sense 
that moviegoing featured among the regular routines of Cavell’s life and is therefore natu-
rally remembered. This indiscernibility of memories might be a reason to evoke the concept 
of autobiography vis-à-vis his relation to the movies: memories of films are ever so often 
intermixed with (different, ‘more real’) life memories; accounting for the first comes down 
to relating the latter. This is why Cavell states that both the idea of writing a study of film 
and the idea of writing an autobiography would have occurred alien to him at the time of 
the original experience. Both writing about a subject one has been deeply involved with and 
narrating one’s life story, I take it, require some sort of distance. Writing about art means 
distancing the original experience; writing about one’s life means taking a step back and 
bringing events one previously lived through into a writerly order. Both movements involve 
retrieval and reconstruction. Around a decade after the end of the period of life recalled 
here, and after eventually having written the study, Cavell finds that to conceptualize cinema 
as a phenomenon or an art form, it has obviously been necessary to exploit his live autobio-
graphical memory.
Depending on which of its themes you are interested in, there are many itineraries through 
the chapters of The World Viewed. I want to argue that Cavell proposes a privileged one right 
in its beginning: namely to read the book not only as a piece of theory concerning the prob-
lems of film art, but simultaneously as a philosophical questioning of the author’s personal 
memory of his up to then unquestioned experience of a life with movies. In this light, it has 
to be understood as an autobiographical as well as an art-critical narrative. More precisely, it 
is exactly Cavell’s memories of a significant part of his life with films that he puts to analytical 
scrutiny in his book. In this light, we might see a parallel movement in Sigmund Freud’s ren-
dition of the technique of working-through, if we think of it as a repeated reconstruction of 
memories to the end of achieving deeper insight into a subject.4 Or, we might think of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s proposal to think of the work of the philosopher as ‘assembling reminders for 
a particular purpose’ (das Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen zu einem bestimmten Zweck),5 
a remark which can also be read, in turn, as acknowledging the impact of Freud’s psychoana-
lytic technique on Wittgenstein’s thinking. Note, in this context, Cavell’s insistence on sup-
porting his observations with his memories of films, rather than with more ‘objective’ data.6 
Read this way, The World Viewed brings autobiographical moments to the surface which form 
 3 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1979), xix.
 4 See Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(London: Karnac Books, 1988), 488–89. 
 5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 
§ 127. 
 6 See Cavell, World Viewed, x, xxiv. 
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the raw material of an aesthetic analysis, confronting them, repeatedly, with the instruments 
of reflection and abstraction.
I take it as a reinforcement of this reading proposal that the first chapter of The World 
Viewed bears the title ‘An Autobiography of Companions’. However, it is not easy to grasp 
the multiple layers of significance of this heading. Even more so since, rather irritatingly, the 
chapter starts with a reference to Leo Tolstoy’s aesthetics – which is a piece of theory hardly 
ever read as a serious contribution to philosophy of art, but instead generally taken to be one 
big conceptual confusion.7 Cavell, for his part, claims to have gained from Tolstoy’s book not 
so much systematic insights but a specific attitude towards the investigation of the arts, a 
certain point of view:
Tolstoy is asking himself not about the nature of art, but about the nature of the 
importance of art. It was when I came to see that these are not separate questions 
– that the answer to the question ‘What is the importance of art?’ is grammatically 
related to, or is a way of answering, the question ‘What is art?’ – that I came to an 
understanding of what Tolstoy was talking about, and came to comprehend further 
ranges in my caring about art.8
This passage from The World Viewed is neither the only instance, nor is it the first one, in 
which Cavell refers to Tolstoy’s book on art.9 Whenever he does so, Cavell highlights Tolstoy’s 
insistence on the personal impact of art, and especially on his criterium that art has to be 
of real importance, or else is merely counterfeit, or fraudulent.10 This importance Tolstoy is 
talking about, Cavell emphasizes, is above all a kind of personal importance, coloured by the 
paradigmatically shared experience of, in the given case, moviegoing. So much so, that bio-
graphical review does not only bring to light the event of seeing a film in company, but, as it 
were, a whole world partly consisting of the memory of films. The way one’s point of view is 
altered by the experience of artworks is thus non-repeatable, tied to a particular point in time 
and space, and above all, relative to the medium in question. In this vein, it almost seems as 
if the films themselves were the companions mentioned in the chapter’s heading. To shed 
further light on the case of movies, Cavell contrasts his experience of reading a novel:
I don’t care whether anyone quite knows the week of awe I spent at the age of twelve 
reading Les Misérables; there are always twelve-year-olds and there is always that 
book for them. But movies, unless they are masterpieces, are not there as they were. 
The hours – through the Laughton-Gable Mutiny on the Bounty; The Crusades; Union 
Pacific; Dawn Patrol; Captain Blood; Algiers; Charlie Chan […]; Murder, My Sweet; White 
Heat; and a hundred others – were hours and days of awe; momentous, but only for 
the moment; unrecapturable fully except in memory and evocation; gone. If you see 
them now for the first time, you may be interested and moved, but you can’t know 
what I know.11
 7 See Leo Tolstoy, What Is Art?, trans. Richard Pevear (London: Penguin Books, 1995); Paul Guyer, A History of 
Modern Aesthetics, vol. 2, The Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 290–96. 
 8 Cavell, World Viewed, 3–4.
 9 Earlier references can be found in Stanley Cavell, ‘Music Discomposed’, in Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book 
of Essays, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 181–82, and ‘A Matter of Meaning It’, in 
Must We Mean What We Say, 206–7.
 10 See, for instance, Cavell, ‘Music Discomposed’, 189; ‘A Matter of Meaning It’, 224. 
 11 Cavell, World Viewed, 10.
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To be sure, this is no general account of features of works of art, but a reconstruction of the 
individual importance of individual moments of aesthetic experience, even if, taken together, 
they constitute a huge reservoir of memory. Cavell gestures towards what he takes the term 
‘importance’ to mean in this context: first, there is the individual significance of the medium 
of movies, as such and in its instances, in immediate experience. Second, there is its demand 
to recapture the reaction it evokes, to put it in words, or in short: a demand for criticism. 
What emerges here as calling for autobiographical methods in aesthetics is the wish to get to 
the depths of the individual (because simultaneously shared) experience vis-à-vis this particu-
lar artwork (as part of the history of this particular medium).
But doesn’t all of this entail plain aesthetic subjectivism? True, acknowledging the impact 
and influence of the autobiographical, as Cavell does, self-consciously counters any ideas 
of neutrality and independence of writer and theory advocated above all, though far from 
exclusively, by analytic philosophy (hence analytic aesthetics). Cavell’s constant attention to 
his own writerly style as well as his recurring interest in questions of voice support this read-
ing. However, Cavell sees neutrality in this sense as neither possible nor desirable, instead he 
argues to the contrary effect, I want to claim, that aesthetics can only be properly understood 
and conducted by exploiting and incorporating a subjective vantage point. This is because 
aesthetics, in his view, cannot be separated from the task of criticism. Or, to put it differ-
ently: it is exactly the connection between experience (reaction) and judgement (criticism), 
between aesthetic subject and the public sphere of taste that should be seen as a model for 
philosophical reflection.
II
This connection between aesthetics and criticism features centrally in Cavell’s early and semi-
nal essay, ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy’. Introducing two examples – namely, 
the question of whether it is possible to paraphrase a poem and the question of whether new, 
so-called atonal music lacks discernible connection to its traditions, which makes it question-
able whether it is to be called music in the first place – Cavell discusses the relation between 
the content of artworks and the ways we (are compelled to) talk about them. In the course 
of this discussion, he distinguishes between the critic’s competence to discern and argue for 
the aesthetic value of an object or event as opposed to the mere agreement with the taste of 
his time and place.12 Of course, it is Immanuel Kant’s conception of aesthetic judgement that 
figures in the background, and Cavell is particularly interested in its core tension between 
subjective judgement and its claim to objectivity. But Cavell reads Kant’s description, uncon-
ventionally, in terms of the linguistic practices underlying both art and its criticism. Only the 
ability to give reasons for an aesthetic judgement, to describe, interpret, and criticize features 
of an object or event, can ground the claim to consent that makes it an aesthetic judgement 
in the first place.13 This is where the ability to put my own experience in words comes in. 
‘The problem of the critic,’ Cavell writes, ‘as of the artist, is not to discount his subjectivity, 
but to include it; not to overcome it in agreement, but to master it in exemplary ways.’14 I 
will return to Cavell’s reading of Kant in a minute, but let me first unpack this quote a lit-
tle further, since I am convinced that it can contribute greatly to understanding how Cavell 
conceives of aesthetics and its methods. Moreover, it sketches how ‘Aesthetic Problems of 
Modern Philosophy’, in accord with other early essays, serves to ground Cavell’s own idea of 
 12 Stanley Cavell, ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy’, in Must We Mean What We Say?, 88. 
 13 See Jennifer A. McMahon, ‘The Sense of Community in Cavell’s Conception of Aesthetic and Moral Judgment’, 
Conversations, no. 2 (2014): 52. 
 14 Cavell, ‘Aesthetic Problems’, 94.
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an ordinary language philosophy, understood as an investigation of the linguistic constitu-
tion of our shared form of life.
Now, in the first part of the quote, Cavell claims that there is a parallel movement in the 
creation of art and in the methods of criticism; and that it affects the critic as well as the artist. 
In either case, Cavell states, subjectivity has to be included, which he thinks constitutes, again 
in either case, a problem. It seems more obvious that there is something problematic to be 
solved or overcome in the case of the artist: She will have to ‘master’ her subjectivity, which 
I suppose means to form a reflective awareness of her personal experience as the particular 
experience it is. And she will have to give it an exemplary form, which I understand means 
to make it artistically meaningful and comprehensible for her audience. (This matching of 
respective subjectivities of artist and beholder is, even if spelled out rather clumsily in terms 
of an emotional ‘infection’, at the very heart of Tolstoy’s aesthetic expressivism. Again, it is 
this core idea of Tolstoy’s account that Cavell is sympathetic to.) It is less obvious, however, in 
what way the subjectivity of the critic could be meant to be ‘included’ and ‘mastered’. Now, 
considering Cavell’s introductory remarks in The World Viewed, the critic’s challenge may also 
be understood to consist in her making her own experience exemplary: which is to say the 
individual, non-repeatable experience of a particular work of art in a particular (biographical) 
situation. In this vein, Cavell’s own practice of writing philosophical film readings, in his later 
film books Pursuits of Happiness or Contesting Tears, both focusing on samples of classic mov-
ies from the Golden Era of Hollywood studio production, radically starts from his personal 
cinematic upbringing, experience, taste, and memory. In these books, his drawing on exam-
ples does not simply serve as an illustration to colour aesthetic investigations, but is meant 
to shape their very structure. It is even meant to let the experience of art interfere with and 
disrupt the course of philosophical theorizing, to establish a critical dialogue between work 
and text. In a later kind of résumé of his work in aesthetics, Cavell highlights accordingly ‘the 
sort of emphasis I place on the criticism, or reading, of individual works of art. I think of this 
emphasis,’ he adds, ‘as letting a work of art have a voice in what philosophy says about it […].’15 
In Pursuits of Happiness, Cavell most clearly describes his approach to philosophical criticism 
of given works as a kind of extension of conversations about individual experiences:
[T]o take an interest in an object is to take an interest in one’s experience of the object, 
so that to examine and defend my interest in these films is to examine and defend my 
interest in my own experience, in the moments and passages of my life I have spent 
with them. This in turn means, for me, defending the process of criticism, so far as 
criticism is thought of, as I think of it, as a natural extension of conversation.16
This passage once again recalls the autobiographical beginning of The World Viewed I quoted 
before in emphasizing not only the importance of the ‘moments and passages of my life’ 
in which the aesthetic encounters have taken place, but also the fact that the beginning of 
criticism is to be found in companionship and conversation, in a characteristically communal 
and shared form of experience, or – one that is essentially public. Criticism does not review 
personal experience for its own sake but makes an offer for taking this experience as an exem-
plary one. Thus, my description of my experience is supposed to work as an invitation to you 
to test the conclusions of my criticism on yourself and your own taste, to see if you, as the 
 15 Cavell, ‘Something Out of the Ordinary’, in Cavell on Film, ed. William Rothman (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2005), 226.
 16 Stanley Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 7.
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viewer, listener, or beholder you are, will be inclined to accept or to dispute my claims.17 This 
is the key to how criticism connects the subjectivity of our judgements with the objectivity 
of aesthetic value. Again, the point is made most explicit in ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern 
Philosophy’. In this essay, Cavell draws a connection between his methods and Kant’s Critique 
of the Power of Judgment and its account of the structure of aesthetic judgement, especially 
of the form Kant calls reflective judgement of taste. Kant conceives of this form of judgement 
as being subjective on the one hand, but nonetheless appealing to universal consent on the 
other: ‘The judgment of taste determines its object with regard to satisfaction (as beauty) with 
a claim to the assent of everyone, as if it were objective. To say “This flower is beautiful” is the 
same as merely to repeat its own claim to everyone’s satisfaction.’18
But not only is this an appropriation of Kant’s argument – Cavell significantly enriches the 
account of the Critique of the Power of Judgment by relating it to the underlying language 
games. He adds a much stronger emphasis on the intersubjectivity of criticism and on the 
possibilities of acknowledgement and refusal of given aesthetic reasons. But even more than 
that, Cavell claims that aesthetic judgement and criticism structurally resemble the claim to 
consent the philosopher aims at when she issues statements about the meaning of terms and 
propositions. The ‘I’ of her claim demands that ‘We’, every one of us, accept it, too:
Kant’s ‘universal voice’ is, with perhaps a slight shift of accent, what we hear recorded 
in the philosopher’s claims about ‘what we say’: such claims are at least as close to 
what Kant calls aesthetical judgments as they are to ordinary hypotheses. […] I wish to 
suggest that it is a claim or dependence of the same kind.19
So, analogous to the structure of aesthetic criticism, the appeal to the ‘We’ of both author 
and reader can be seen as the basic move of Cavell’s own understanding of an ‘ordinary lan-
guage philosophy’, which he works out, influenced by his readings of John L. Austin and 
Wittgenstein, as an investigation of our common and everyday use of language as well as 
our (common and everyday) alienation from it. This is the point by way of which Cavell’s 
view of aesthetic understanding more or less explicitly forms the basis of his philosophical 
approach as a whole. It also leads back to the methodological idea I pointed to by quoting the 
autobiographical beginning of The World Viewed, because it is exactly the reason for Cavell’s 
insistence on making his personal experience heard. Timothy Gould points out how the prob-
lematization of the relation of ‘I’ and ‘We’ in Cavell forms the philosophical basis of his use of 
autobiographical remarks and exercises:
Cavell’s interest in the relation of autobiography to philosophy begins with his attend-
ing to the philosopher’s use of ‘We’. […] [W]hatever impulses to autobiography may 
animate Cavell’s work, one of the most central impulses is methodological […]. He 
does not explore the intricacies and the evasions of the ‘I’ solely for its own sake: he is 
always also exploring the relation of the ‘I’ and the ‘We’, of the philosopher’s ability to 
claim accord based on nothing more than the self-critical understanding of his or her 
own representativeness.20
 17 See Richard Eldridge, Literature, Life, and Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 23–26. 
 18 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), § 32.
 19 Cavell, ‘Aesthetic Problems’, 94. 
 20 Timothy Gould, ‘Me, Myself, and Us: Autobiography and Method in the Work of Stanley Cavell’, Conversations, 
no. 1 (2013): 4–5.
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Gould not only links this attention to the connection of ‘I’ and ‘We’ to Cavell’s reading of 
Kant in ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy’, and thus to his view of aesthetic judge-
ment and criticism, but also to the themes of scepticism, alienation, and acknowledgement 
Cavell’s philosophy as a whole revolves around, most extensively in The Claim of Reason. 
I noted before that Cavell conceives of ordinary language as the language we are at once 
always already at home in, while simultaneously always already alienated from. The existen-
tial threat of scepticism Cavell works out in this book is not so much an epistemic problem 
concerning our (doubtful) knowledge of the world and the others in it, but it is the all-too-
human impulse to avoid confrontation with either, and thus to avoid self-recognition in the 
things and beings around me. This avoidance, to be sure, is frequently effective in the realm 
of philosophy, in philosophers’ efforts to make language more precise – inhumanly precise, 
as it were. In this view, Cavell’s stylistic efforts to repeatedly return to the exemplary and the 
everyday are intended as a form of philosophical therapy, shaped, as I pointed out above, by 
Cavell’s understanding of Freud’s and Wittgenstein’s methods. This way, as Gould sums up, 
an autobiographically infused style of writing can serve to show us our position in relation to 
ourselves and thus enhance our self-understanding: ‘Autobiography becomes philosophical 
at least in part as a counter movement to human evasiveness. That is, autobiography is not 
just the story of someone’s life but a kind of written concentration of it.’21
Cavell offers the most detailed reflections on how he conceives of the relationship between 
autobiography and philosophy in his 1992 Jerusalem-Harvard Lectures, published as A Pitch 
of Philosophy. These lectures revolve around questions of pitch, that is, themes of style, tone, 
and voice in philosophy, not only in relation to the autobiographical, but also in relation 
to the artform of the opera, and in relation to the infamous 1970s debate between Jacques 
Derrida and John Searle about their readings of Austin’s philosophy. In the first part, however, 
Cavell grounds his reflections on autobiography and philosophy in an acknowledgement of 
his own indebtedness to Austin’s methods, which can be read, again, as an emphasis on the 
relation of ‘I’ and ‘We’. Simultaneously, it is a kind of autobiographical tracing back of his own 
thinking to his teacher’s, and hence the tradition it is rooted in. The recourse to autobiogra-
phy, that is, is inherent in any philosophical attention to the ordinary of our language. Which 
is exactly the fact that gives philosophy its oft-noted peculiar status between science and 
literature, between the description of our linguistic practices and a kind of self-exploration 
as language user:
Philosophers who proceed as Austin suggests will not be much interested to poll oth-
ers for their opinion about such crossroads. […] Their basis is autobiographical, but 
they evidently take what they do and say to be representative or exemplary of the 
human condition as such. In this way they interpret philosophy’s arrogance as the 
arrogation of the right to speak for us, to say whatever there is to say in the human 
resistance to the drag of metaphysics and of skepticism; and authorize that arrogation 
in the claim to representativeness, expressed autobiographically.22
The question of the relationship between philosophy and literature, between the quest for 
intersubjective truths and the need for an individual voice, or tone, or pitch, to express it, how-
ever, is the note already The Claim of Reason ends on, leaving open the question of whether 
philosophy can ever become (that is to say, I think, gain the expressive means of) literature 
 21 Gould, ‘Me, Myself, and Us’, 15. 
 22 Stanley Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 8. 
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without losing itself.23 In The Claim of Reason, the question is a result of the way Cavell finds 
the attraction as well as the threat of the other pictured concisely in Shakespeare’s plays, 
and so it aims at whether philosophy can find a way to express these facts for itself. In his 
later variation of the same problem, it is rather the subjective truth of the commonness of 
my life that prompts the question. The model of judging and criticizing art points to this 
intersection of my subjectivity and our common world and understanding. Incorporating the 
autobiographical in philosophical expression is thus seen as one of the basic challenges of 
the endeavour of self-reflection. Cavell makes it more than obvious that this works both ways:
The autobiographical dimension of philosophy is internal to the claim that 
philosophy speaks for the human, for all; that is its necessary arrogance. The philosoph-
ical dimension of autobiography is that the human is representative, say imitative, 
that each life is exemplary of all, a parable of each; that is humanity’s commonness, 
which is internal to its endless denials of commonness.24
So, concerning this acknowledgement of, we might say, the arrogance of the exemplar, we 
can see a trajectory from Cavell’s earliest essays to Little Did I Know, in which he, eventually, 
tells the philosophical story of the exemplary life of Stanley Cavell (or: the exemplary story of 
the philosophical life of Stanley Cavell).25 Throughout the course of his work in and outside 
aesthetics, Cavell uses autobiographical elements not just for decoration and anecdote. On 
the contrary, as I have shown, right from the start they play a systematic role at the basis of 
his thinking.
III
Up to this point, I highlighted several strains of recourse to autobiography in Cavell’s work. 
I particularly argued that his making use of autobiographical material as a way of doing 
philosophy is grounded in his early texts on aesthetics, which are concerned with connec-
tions between the value of art and the language of criticism. And I argued that the general 
idea of Cavell’s – as we might call it – argument from the autobiographical is shaped by these 
aesthetic reflections. But even if you grant this, you might still object that all of my results 
concern the thematic preferences and stylistic idiosyncrasies of a single author rather than 
something of general value for aesthetic theory, let alone philosophical reflection in general. 
In my concluding remarks, I will defend the view that, by way of incorporating autobiographi-
cal reflection in his philosophical method, Cavell aims at a critical philosophy, which means 
that it is, first of all, critical of itself, aware of its own conditions. As a matter of fact, the term 
‘philosophy’ carries the same ambivalence in Cavell as it does in Wittgenstein: Both use it, 
on the one hand, in order to classify traditional forms of philosophical conceptions which, 
in their views, characteristically misunderstand the conceptions’ very problems or wrongly 
estimate their scope. But they also use it, on the other hand, to refer to their own respective 
methods and ideas, thus proposing a revisionary form of philosophy (or at least a revisionary 
understanding of its traditions). The aesthetic slant to Cavell’s philosophy, then, involves a cri-
tique of traditional methods, emphasizing instead the importance of matters of style and voice 
– which is to say the aesthetic problems of philosophy itself, taken as its own subject matter:
 23 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), 496. 
 24 Cavell, Pitch of Philosophy, 10–11.
 25 Stanley Cavell, Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
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Consider that philosophy’s distrust of, or ambivalence toward, the autobiographical, 
or personal, is characteristically expressed in its sense that an attention to style in 
writing – we might say signature – is a sign of the unphilosophical, unless perhaps it 
is plainly marked as an escapable diversion.26
If this is an accurate diagnosis, the aesthetic self-critique of philosophy Cavell is putting 
forth harks back to a proper understanding of philosophical aesthetics.27 Which makes 
philosophy of art much less harmless or peripheric an enterprise than one might suppose at 
first glance. Rather, its very outlines specifically point to, and embody, philosophy’s general 
tension between the subjective and objective, between the attention to phenomena and the 
reflection on our very basic understandings.28
Perhaps it is even characteristic of the best philosophies concerned with modernist or con-
temporary art that they, at some point, get personal – Cavell’s is of course not the only exam-
ple in this respect. Making room for the autobiographical serves to acknowledge the taste and 
education that shapes the formation of one’s theory, that is it lays open its autobiographical 
undercurrents. But that is also to say that theories of that kind acknowledge the significance 
of criticism for any theorizing of art. Let me just remind you, exemplarily, of Arthur Danto’s 
repeatedly told and almost mythical tale of his visit to Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box show in New 
York 1964,29 or of Alva Noë’s accounts, in Strange Tools, of his own encounters with various 
works of art and of his growing up in the Greenwich Village art scene of the 1970s. Rendering 
a detailed account of his artistic upbringing, Noë is straightforward in acknowledging the 
autobiographical undercurrents of his own art theory:
I tell all this not to drop names but because, looking back on it now, I want to acknowl-
edge how remarkable it is to have grown up in this art community. I also put down 
these personal memories because they help me to state my motivation to undertake 
the research of this book. For me, art isn’t just another phenomenon to which I can 
apply my theory. It is personal. The question of art, the question of why it matters, what 
it is, how it figures in our lives, is in some ways my very first problem in philosophy.30
The core situation of aesthetic theorizing is a matter of personal history (which is to say 
memory), so there is a special position here for its autobiographical re-telling as an indi-
vidual situation. Thus, I will always have to argue from the impact a work has had on me to 
its aesthetic value. In that sense, aesthetics is inseparably connected to the criticism of indi-
vidual artworks. But in the same sense, it is always connected to narratives sorting what we 
experience as art in an historic course. I am convinced that Hegel’s aesthetics, in its dynamic 
extension of Kant’s ideas, aims at doing philosophical justice to the inherent historicity of 
art exactly by constantly blending art criticism and philosophical analysis. As such, it is the 
 26 Cavell, Pitch of Philosophy, 14. 
 27 Simo Säätelä argues for a parallel movement in Wittgenstein in his ‘Aesthetics – Wittgenstein’s Paradigm of 
Philosophy?’, Aisthesis 4 (2013): 35–53.
 28 This point is made extraordinarily clear by Christoph Menke in his very short essay on ‘Die Möglichkeit der 
Ästhetik’, in Denken und Disziplin: Workshop der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Ästhetik (2017), ed. Juliane Rebentisch, 
http://www.dgae.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/dgaeX_dud_menke.pdf. 
 29 See, for instance, Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), vi–viii; Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in Post-Historical Perspective 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 5–7. 
 30 Alva Noë, Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature (New York: Hill and Wang, 2015), 208.
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inevitable model for every attempt to make our contemporary experience of art explicit – 
although this is a story to be told elsewhere.31
It is the art of and after modernism, however, in the realm of which Cavell’s observations 
show their importance all the more, because here, as Cavell, Danto, and Noë (as well as 
Theodor W. Adorno, for that matter) all argue, the constitution of the work of art makes it 
characteristically obvious that its very nature cannot be separated from the process of criti-
cism, call it interpretation, reading, or understanding. From this vantage point, the employ-
ment of the autobiographical is a way of acknowledging the irreducible subjective core of 
criticism, hence aesthetic theory. When it comes to the arts, theorizing remains empty with-
out recourse to experience, which I think goes to say: my own personal experience in the 
encounter with a work of art or another aesthetic object.
This tension between the elusiveness of the object and the obtrusiveness of my critical 
subjectivity is the central problem of modernity, the one that Cavell frames with his concept 
of scepticism. Since it is the central problem of modernity, a modernist philosophy would, 
first of all, have to acknowledge its own status, that is, self-critically incorporate its condi-
tions. The model for such an acknowledgement of its own conditions are the modernist arts, 
constantly reflecting on and thereby transforming their media. It is obvious that Cavell sees 
Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s methods as paradigmatic for the achievement of modern philo-
sophical self-critique – and that he, in his own writing, strives to appropriate their spirit. This 
spirit runs counter, of course, to the alleged neutrality of philosophical argument, precisely, 
as Jay Bernstein argues, by declining conclusiveness:
The most direct way in which modernist philosophy reveals its distance from the 
ideal type of legal-rational authority has been via its fragmentary form. The fragment 
defies subordination from first premises; but it is just the structure of subordination 
(from first premises or from an ideal method or procedure) that constitutes the purely 
rational authority of the ideal-type analytic philosophy.32
In Bernstein’s account, too, this characteristic of Cavell’s critique of philosophy has its roots 
in his aesthetic theory. Consequently, Bernstein is eventually led to the question of the sub-
jective, or autobiographical voice in Cavell. He frames this question, interestingly, by referring 
to just the passage in ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy’ I quoted above:
What if we say that the force of the philosophical fragment derives from the voice 
or person of the philosopher, where this is understood as the philosopher mastering 
her subjectivity and making it exemplary? […] And if there is going to be something 
corresponding to the sensuousness of the artwork, the singular voice is a plausible 
candidate. And how better to rebel against the self-righteous impersonality of the 
analytic ideal-type?33
In the last instance, Bernstein rather avoids to answer this question, because he seems to 
doubt the philosophical value of autobiographical speech. However, instead of arguing 
for this judgement, he turns to highlight the aphoristic beauty of an exemplary remark of 
 31 A version of such an account is developed in Jacques Rancière, Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art, 
trans. Zakir Paul (London: Verso, 2013), esp. chap. 2. Some further thoughts concerning this idea can be found 
in the chapter on ‘Nachträglichkeit’ in Schuff, Ästhetisches Verstehen, 153–73. 
 32 Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies, 109. 
 33 Ibid., 111. 
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Cavell’s taken from one of his film readings. It is true, as Bernstein claims, that the force of 
the fragment as such derives from its confrontation or constellation with something else: be 
it a text, be it a work of art. My point, however, is exactly to show how such constellations are, 
inevitably, informed and shaped by personal history and experience. In my reading, this is 
what Cavell confronts us with in his autobiographical endeavours. He lays bare the aesthetic 
difficulties of having to put forth our own writing against the background of tradition and 
contemporary fashion, against our own time, as it were.34 The unresolved modernist chal-
lenge remains that these claims to philosophical truth are as inherently contestable as the 
artist’s formal choices or the conflicting versions of autobiographical narration themselves.
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